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No Exit, No End: Probation in Rhode
Island
Lara Montecalvo, Kara Maguire, and Angela Yingling *†

Imagine you are a criminal defense lawyer practicing in
Rhode Island. One day you receive a call from a frantic
Attorneys in the Appellate Division of the Rhode Island Public Defender.
We are extremely grateful to Olin Thompson, Timothy Baldwin, and our
colleagues at the Rhode Island Public Defender’s Office for their invaluable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this Article. We are also
indebted to the staff at the Roger Williams University Law Review for their
editorial assistance.
† Inspired by the March 2015 Symposium Sounding the Alarm on Mass
Incarceration: Moving Beyond the Problem and Toward Solutions
(“Symposium”) at Roger Williams University School of Law, this Article was
drafted in August and early September of 2015. At the same time, Governor
Gina Raimondo’s Justice Reinvestment Working Group was beginning to
work on several proposals to alter the state of probation and incarceration in
Rhode Island. See Press Release, R.I. Office of the Governor, Raimondo
Launches Working Group to Improve Criminal Justice System, Reduce Costs
(July 7, 2015), available at http://www.ri.gov/press/view/25229. Recently, we
have begun to see the results of the group’s efforts: The same week this
Article was submitted for publication, a majority of justices on the Rhode
Island Superior Court proposed a series of amendments to the rules that
address some of the concerns discussed herein. See Order Soliciting
Comments on Proposed Amendments to the Rhode Island Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Superior Court Sentencing Benchmarks
(Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SupremeCourt/Supreme
MiscOrders/Order-ProposedAmendmentsSuperiorCourtRulesofCriminal
Procedure-SentencingBenchmarks3-16-16.pdf.
We are hopeful that the
efforts of the working group, the courts, and others will continue to improve
the criminal justice landscape in Rhode Island and render obsolete some of
the observations made in this Article. The same may be true of our
references to other states’ practices because this area of law is rapidly
evolving as the states explore ways to encourage rehabilitation while limiting
the cost of corrections.
*
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woman, “Ana.” She is eight months pregnant and her
twenty-five-year-old husband, “Dennis,” has been arrested
on a misdemeanor charge of simple assault after an
incident at a local bar. Ana tells you that Dennis is
currently being held without bail at the state’s jail facility,
and that his next court date is not for two weeks. He has a
decent job at a local carpet installation company, she
explains, but he is in danger of losing it if he misses too
many days of work.1
At first, this scenario might seem to be implausible; after all,
the Rhode Island State Constitution requires that every person
arrested on a misdemeanor charge be afforded reasonable bail.2
However, in her distress, Ana forgot to mention one important
fact: At the time Dennis was arrested, he was also serving a oneyear probationary sentence for a previous charge.3 As a result,
when Dennis was brought to court the day after the bar fight, he
was not only arraigned on the simple assault charge, but he was
also presented with a notice of the state’s intention to revoke his
probation based on the new allegations.4

1. “Dennis’s” case is modeled on the real-world experiences of criminal
defense practitioners in Rhode Island. While this example is based on actual
cases, the names and details have been altered for the purposes of this
Article.
2. See R.I. CONST. art. I, § 9.
3. Ten months earlier, after a friend’s house party had grown a little
too out-of-control, Dennis had unwisely confronted one of the officers
summoned to break up the revelry; minutes later, he found himself charged
with resisting arrest and disorderly conduct. After spending the night at the
local police station, Dennis appeared in the District Court the following
morning for arraignment on his misdemeanor charges. Knowing that he had
been a little intoxicated the previous night, and that the complaining witness
was a police officer, Dennis had accepted the judge’s offer to plead nolo
contendere to the resisting arrest charge in exchange for a one-year
probationary sentence and the dismissal of the disorderly conduct charge. It
had seemed like a good deal at the time, so Dennis decided to resolve his case
on the spot, without consulting an attorney. Dennis’s entire exchange with
the judge took less than ten minutes.
4. Pursuant to Rule 32(f) of the Rhode Island District Court Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the state must provide the probationer with notice of its
intention to seek the revocation of their probation. R.I. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P.
32(f). This document, informally referred to as a “32(f) petition,” is often
presented to the defendant on the same day they are arraigned on a new
criminal charge.
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INTRODUCTION

No defense attorney will deny that probation is a valuable
part of the criminal justice system. When used appropriately, it
provides a cost-effective alternative to incarceration and permits
lower-risk individuals to remain in the community under certain
stated conditions. However, in Rhode Island, where defendants
are often placed on disproportionately long terms of supervision,
the probationary system has ballooned into a resource-draining
behemoth.5 Unfortunately, the system’s growth in size has not
been matched by an increase in efficacy; too often, the inequitable
structure of the probation revocation process results in the overincarceration of probationers, frequently for minor transgressions
or even specious allegations.6
This Article begins in Part I with an overview of Rhode
Island’s probation violation system viewed through the lens of a
criminal defense attorney advising a specific client, “Dennis,” and
highlights many of the problems associated with the state’s
probation violation paradigm. In Part II, the focus moves from the
practitioner to the law governing probation violations in Rhode
Island and elsewhere.
In Section II.A, the extremely low
standards of legal and factual proof employed in probation
violation hearings in Rhode Island are dissected and the potential
for modifying those standards is discussed. Section II.B contains
suggestions for reforms of probation violation law, including
modifying the legal and factual standards of proof. In Section
II.C, two rule-based changes that might efficiently reduce the
number of unnecessarily lengthy probationary sentences in this
state are examined.
I.

YOUR CLIENT ON PROBATION

To those unfamiliar with the criminal justice system, the idea
of accepting a prison sentence based on false or unsupported
allegations is simply unthinkable; after all, why would anyone
5. See John Hill, Expert: Rhode Island’s Outdated Probation System
Needs Overhaul, PROVIDENCE J. (Oct. 27, 2015, 11:15 PM), http://www.
providencejournal.com/article/20151027/NEWS/151029335.
6. See CAITLIN O’CONNOR & DANIELLE BARRON, R.I. DEP’T OF CORR.,
RIDOC HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 19 (2015) [hereinafter RIDOC HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW],
http://www.doc.ri.gov/docs/RIDOC%20Historical%20Overview.
pdf.
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ever plead guilty to a crime they did not commit? However, any
seasoned defense attorney practicing in Rhode Island—having
asked numerous clients about their prior records—has had this
conversation before:
“So you have two prior convictions for breaking and
entering?”
“Yes, well, I was guilty the first time. The second one, I
didn’t do.”
“Well, it says right here that you admitted to the second as
well. Why?”
“I had to; I was on probation.”
Although succinct, this answer is deceivingly complicated.
Indeed, to fully understand how probation—a supposed
alternative to incarceration—can ultimately lead to unjust
imprisonment, one must start at the very beginning of the typical
revocation process: the arrest and presentment of the violation
notice.
A. Go Directly to Jail; Do Not Pass Go
Let’s return to Dennis. As Ana told you, he was held without
bail at his presentment—i.e., the first day he appeared in court.
At Dennis’s presentment hearing—a proceeding akin in both
length and depth to an arraignment on a criminal charge—the
court had the choice to release him on his own recognizance, set
surety bail, or hold him without bail.7 In practice, the decision to
grant or withhold bail in these cases is often made on the basis of
cursory and one-sided evidence.8 This initial proceeding, in our
experience, typically involves little more than a mere recitation of
the allegations by the prosecuting officer. In most of these cases,
the accused has not yet consulted with an attorney or, if they have
done so, it had only been for a few brief moments.
7. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-14 (2006) (“The court . . . pending receipt
of [the probationary authority’s written report on defendant’s conduct], may
order the defendant held without bail . . . .” (emphasis added)); R.I. SUPER.
CT. R. CRIM. P. 32(f) (“The defendant may be admitted to bail pending [a
probation revocation] hearing.”).
8. Cf. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9; State v. Vashey, 823 A.2d 1151, 1155
(R.I. 2003) (defendants facing probation violation allegation have no right to
preliminary hearing to determine probable cause).
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Despite the fact that both the Rhode Island General Laws and
the District and Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure
establish a presumption of bail in violation proceedings,9 in our
experience, only a small number of alleged violators are released
pending a hearing. Rather, most defendants, like Dennis, are
denied bail throughout the duration of their case on the basis of a
five-minute court appearance.10 While the presentment is not
intended to be a full hearing, the severity of the consequences—
near-certain detention for a minimum of two weeks—is vastly
disproportional to the amount of scrutiny that the allegations are
given at this proceeding.
Recent statistics reveal that the average pretrial/prehearing
detention in Rhode Island is twenty-three days in length, with
fifteen percent of alleged offenders remaining on pretrial status
after thirty days.11 This presents a significant problem for these
probationers: How many people can just—without notice—walk
away from their life for twenty-three days without suffering major
consequences to their jobs, housing situations, and families? Too
often, as the probationer sits in jail, his or her life on the outside
begins to crumble. Criminal defense attorneys witness this
phenomenon all of the time, and can offer little comfort to their
incarcerated clients or their families. After all, most employers
are understandably not sympathetic about an unplanned weekslong absence from work, causing many probationers to lose jobs
that were difficult to obtain in the first place. Similarly, many
probationers and their families lose their housing as a result of
this detention12 because it is difficult, if not impossible, to pay
9. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-19-9, -14; R.I. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 32(f); R.I.
DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 32(f); see also R.I. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 46(i); R.I. SUPER.
CT. R. CRIM. P. 46(i).
10. Recently, spurred on in part by the Symposium, some public
defenders in Rhode Island have begun to advocate more vociferously for bail
to be set in certain probation violation cases. As of the drafting of this Article
in September of 2015, the authors can report anecdotally that a few Superior
Court justices have been responsive, releasing more alleged violators on bail
in appropriate circumstances. However, the vast majority of alleged violators
are still held without bail pending a hearing.
11. R.I. DEP’T OF CORR., FISCAL YEAR 2014 ANNUAL POPULATION REPORT
13
(2014),
http://www.doc.ri.gov/docs/FY14%20Annual%20Report%20109.pdf.
12. In our practice representing defendants in both District and Superior
Courts, we have observed our clients lose their housing as a result of
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rent and bills from behind bars. Additionally, alleged violators
must scramble for emergency care for children, elderly family
members, and even pets. In many cases, the alleged violation is
trivial—a misdemeanor, perhaps, or a minor drug charge, or even
just a “technical violation,” i.e., no new charge at all—and these
collateral consequences can cause the probationer to suffer
disproportionally to the nature of the allegation.13
The immediate, nearly ubiquitous detention of alleged
violators puts probationers in a precarious position. As each day
passes, the consequences of continued incarceration grow more
severe for the accused and their families: bills accrue, jobs are lost,
emergency childcare providers grow weary. The state’s leverage
over the defendant increases, incentivizing the defendant to enter
into a plea deal—on the violation as well as the underlying
charge—regardless of the weaknesses of the allegations. This
widespread detention of alleged violators becomes even more
problematic when it is combined with the diminished level of due
process guarantees afforded to individuals at the actual violation
hearing.
B. The Violation Hearing: The Presumption of Guilt
At the next court date, you meet with Dennis in one of the
tiny, cinderblock attorney rooms in the courthouse
cellblock. It is two weeks later, the day of the hearing, and
it has been three days since your last visit with Dennis at
the prison.
A thick pane of glass muffles your
conversation, so you lean down to speak through the small
screen located at the bottom of the window. First, you
relatively short periods of detention. This phenomenon has been documented
in the mainstream press; a recent article about the bail system in New York
City found that “[d]isappearing into the machinery of the justice system [by
failing to make bail] separates family members, interrupts work and
jeopardizes housing.” Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES: MAG. (Aug. 13,
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html.
13. Remember, too, that these detainees are only accused violators; the
immediate detention upends the lives of the innocent as well as the guilty. In
some cases, violation reports are withdrawn as the evidence wilts under later
scrutiny or upon further investigation. However, due to the mass prehearing
detention of accused violators, any such vindication often comes at a steep
price: The probationer may walk out of jail, but they might do so as homeless,
jobless, or both.
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update Dennis with the good news: You have been able to
track down one of the other patrons at the bar on the night
of his arrest. This woman, “Sara,” is willing to testify that
the complaining witness, “John,” had assaulted Dennis
over a spilled drink and some angry words, and that
Dennis’s participation in the fight had only been in selfdefense. Dennis breaks into an excited smile at your
words, but it quickly fades from his face as you continue,
reminding him of the bad news:
Like all accused
violators, his fate will be determined by a judge via a
probation violation hearing—a David-versus-Goliath-style
proceeding where the state’s standard of proof is
frighteningly low, the rules of evidence are loosely applied,
and the defendant’s confrontational rights are severely
constrained.
Even though an individual’s freedom—his or her most
fundamental liberty interest—is at stake at a probation violation
hearing, the alleged violator is afforded a mere sliver of the due
process rights that form the bedrock of our criminal justice
system. While it has been long recognized that a probation
revocation hearing is civil in nature, and thus not subject to the
stricter rules enforced in a criminal trial,14 the overly-relaxed
burden of proof and diminished evidentiary standards have all but
transformed the violation hearing process into a mere formality.
Many alleged violators put it another way: As soon as they put the
handcuffs on me, I knew it was over.
This oft-repeated refrain, familiar to the ears of any
experienced criminal defense attorney, is technically incorrect—
only a judge or magistrate, after either a hearing or an admission,
can adjudicate a person a probation violator and impose a
sentence of imprisonment.15 But, to the man or woman sitting in
14. The Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated that a probationviolation hearing “is not part of a criminal prosecution, and, thus, does not
call for the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a criminal
proceeding.” State v. Bourdeau, 448 A.2d 1247, 1248 (R.I. 1982).
15. Pursuant to both statute and court rule, probationers are entitled to
an evidentiary hearing to determine whether they have violated the
conditions of their probation. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9 (2006); R.I. SUPER. CT.
R. CRIM. P. 32(f). If the court, after such a hearing, determines that a
violation has occurred, it may either continue the probationary term or
sentence the probationer to a period of imprisonment. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-
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one of the cramped cells of Rhode Island’s Adult Correctional
Institutions, this distinction is a matter of mere semantics. As
both defense attorneys and probationers know far too well, an
incarceration sentence often becomes a fait accompli upon a
probationer’s arrest. This is due in large part to three factors: (1)
the relaxed application of the rules of evidence and constitutional
principles in violation hearings; (2) the exceedingly low and vague
standard of proof employed in these hearings; and (3) the near
absolute sentencing discretion granted to the hearing justice.16
Combined, these factors result in very few defendants willing to
take the risk and fight for their freedom at a hearing.
While a criminal trial functions as the ultimate crucible,
where evidence is both scrutinized under a set of strict rules and
forced to endure the fiery test of cross-examination, the violation
hearing, in contrast, is a much less exacting process. Hearsay
19-9. In cases where the defendant is serving a “straight” probationary
sentence—one without a concomitant suspended sentence—the court may
currently impose a prison sentence of any length after a violation hearing,
provided that the sentence does not exceed the maximum statutory penalty
for the original charge. Id. In cases where the violator’s probation is
accompanied by a suspended sentence, the court can either: (1) impose the
entire suspended sentence, (2) impose a portion of the suspended sentence, or
(3) continue the suspension of the entire sentence. Id.
16. The state is also permitted to use illegally obtained evidence to prove
a violation, except where police actions are intended to harass, or where such
actions “shock the conscience” of the court—circumstances which, to the
authors’ knowledge, have never been found in Rhode Island. See State v.
Spratt, 386 A.2d 1094, 1095 n.2 (R.I. 1978). The rationale for not applying
the exclusionary rule to constitutional violations was that “it would be
unrealistic to believe that a police officer will be further deterred from
engaging in an unlawful search by the knowledge that his conduct will render
the illegally obtained evidence inadmissible not only at a criminal trial but
also at a revocation hearing.” Id. at 1095. Given the current legal landscape
in Rhode Island, where the threat of revocation often accompanies—and
sometimes supplants—criminal prosecution, there is good reason to question
whether the lack of the exclusionary rule in violation hearings is, in fact,
serving as an incentive for police to ignore the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution, especially when dealing with young, black residents in highcrime neighborhoods. See RIDOC HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 29
(noting that one in six black male Rhode Islanders over the age of eighteen
are under community corrections supervision); R.I. DEP’T OF CORR., ADULT
PROB. & PAROLE, RI PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFENDERS LIVING IN RI
COMMUNITIES AS OF 12-31-14, at 6 (2015), http://www.doc.ri.gov/
docs/PP%20city-gender%20data%2012-31-14-expanded%20age%202.pdf
(noting that one in ten men between the ages of twenty-five and twenty-nine
that live in the 02909 ZIP code are on probation or parole).
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evidence is admissible upon a showing of “good cause,” even when
it implicates a defendant’s constitutional right to confrontation.17
Thus, a defendant does not always have the opportunity to have
his or her accuser testify to the allegations in person, under oath,
and in a courtroom; in many cases, a responding police officer can
recite the complaining witness’s claims, often based on the officer’s
memory or a brief report.18 The analysis employed in Crawford v.
Washington, which strictly limits the admissibility of “testimonial”
statements without the unavailability of the witness and a prior
opportunity for cross-examination,19 has been held to be
inapplicable to probation violation proceedings.20 In practice, this
curtailment of the confrontation right presents the state with an
incentive to introduce its evidence through the sanitized
testimony of these professional witnesses instead of the less
predictable, but first-hand, accounts of civilian eyewitnesses or
complainants.
These relaxed rules of evidence become even more troubling
when combined with Rhode Island’s shockingly low standard of
proof at a probation violation hearing. Rhode Island is one of the
few states that allows the hearing justice to find against a
probationer as long as the evidence “reasonably satisfies” her that
a violation has occurred.21 This standard raises an important
question—what does it take to “reasonably satisfy” the court?
Furthermore, the judge does not need to find that the probationer
actually committed a crime or broke a specific condition of
probation in order to impose a prison sentence; she must merely

17. State v. Bernard, 925 A.2d 936, 939 (R.I. 2007) (citing State v.
DeRoche, 389 A.2d 1229, 1234 (R.I. 1978)).
18. See, e.g., State v. Pompey, 934 A.2d 210, 213 (R.I. 2007).
19. 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
20. Pompey, 934 A.2d at 214.
21. See State v. Gibson, 126 A.3d 427, 431 (R.I. 2015) (quoting State v.
Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 499 (R.I. 2013)). Recently, however, a majority of
justices of the Rhode Island Superior Court have proposed raising the legal
standard of proof at a violation hearing, which would require the state to
prove an alleged violation by a “fair preponderance of the evidence.” See
Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments to the Rhode Island
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and Superior Court Sentencing
Benchmarks (Mar. 16, 2016) [hereinafter Order Soliciting Comments on
Proposed Amendments], https://www.courts.ri.gov/Courts/SupremeCourt/
SupremeMiscOrders/Order-ProposedAmendmentsSuperiorCourtRulesof
CriminalProcedureSentencingBenchmarks3-16-16.pdf.
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be satisfied that the defendant “failed to keep the peace and to
remain on good behavior” on the day in question.22 The reality is
that this standard is as low as it is vague, leaving attorneys and
defendants uncertain of both the type and quantum of proof
necessary to sustain a finding of violation.
Given this probation violation landscape, prevailing at a
violation hearing is a Herculean task, even for the innocent. As a
result, a defendant facing flimsy or questionable allegations is
often left to one of two unfortunate fates. First, if she elects to go
to a hearing, she has a good chance of losing on extremely weak,
unreliable, or even unsupported evidence, and facing years—if not
decades—of imprisonment as a result, even if the criminal charges
are later dismissed or amended.23 This phenomenon—often
referred to as the “proxy trial” problem—allows the state to
“supplant[] the use of the more rigorous trial proceeding, and in
effect create[] a criminal conviction where one might not otherwise
be available.”24 This is especially true in Rhode Island, where a
hearing justice may consider the “totality of the circumstances”
when determining what sentence to impose after a violation
hearing,25 and has wide discretion in fashioning the imprisonment
sentence.26 Thus, a hearing justice can take the new allegations
into consideration when shaping a violation sentence, even if
liability for that conduct has not been established through the

22. State v. Gautier, 774 A.2d 882, 887 (R.I. 2001) (quoting State v.
Znosko, 755 A.2d 832, 835 (R.I. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. See Andrew Horwitz, The Costs of Abusing Probationary Sentences:
Overincarceration and the Erosion of Due Process, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 753,
766, 771 (2010).
24. Daniel F. Piar, A Uniform Code of Procedure for Revoking Probation,
31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 117, 119–20 (2003); see also AM. BAR ASS’N PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 5.3
cmt., at 63 (1970); Horwitz, supra note 23, at 785.
25. State v. Wisehart, 569 A.2d 434, 437 (R.I. 1990).
26. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9 (2006). It is important to note,
however, that a majority of the Rhode Island Superior Court justices have
recently attempted to create more uniformity in violation sentences via a
proposed amendment to the Superior Court Sentencing Benchmarks. See
Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note 21, at 4.
The proposed change would require a Superior Court justice to consider the
sentencing benchmark ranges for the original offense when imposing a
violation sentence, and would allow departure from the benchmarks only
“when substantial and compelling circumstances exist.” Id. at 3–4.
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rigorous criminal prosecution process.27
In the second group of cases, alleged violators, knowing they
are facing near-impossible odds at a hearing, decide to admit to
the false or unsubstantiated allegations in exchange for a shorter
sentence. As criminal defense attorneys practicing in Rhode
Island can confirm, a probationer charged with a new criminal
offense is often offered a sentencing incentive to resolve both the
new charge and the violation at the same time.28 Usually, this
deal includes a defined violation sentence (lower than the
maximum term the defendant could face after a violation hearing),
conditioned on a nolo contendere plea to the related misdemeanor
or felony charge.29 In District Court, where the violation hearing
and criminal trial are usually scheduled for the same day, the
probationer often is given a choice of either resolving both cases
with an admission of guilt, or proceeding to both a bench trial and
the violation hearing that very day.30 In Superior Court, where
the violation hearing is usually scheduled long before the criminal
charge is reached for trial, the defendant must often choose either
an immediate violation hearing or an accelerated, combined plea
disposition on both the violation and criminal charge(s).31 If used
27. This was not always the case: in State v. Wisehart, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court substantially limited prior caselaw that prevented the
hearing justice from considering the new allegations when determining an
appropriate violation sentence. See 569 A.2d at 436–37 (finding that
evidence of criminal conduct or bad behavior adduced at a hearing can be
taken into account at sentencing because it gives the sentencing justice
insight into the probationer’s “amenability to rehabilitation”).
28. See COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS: JUST. CTR., RHODE ISLAND JUSTICE
REINVESTMENT WORKING GROUP: THIRD MEETING 14, 21 (Oct. 27, 2015)
[hereinafter THIRD MEETING], https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/11/RhodeIslandWorkingGroup3.pdf.
29. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-19-8, -9, -19.
30. In all misdemeanor cases, Rhode Island criminal defendants have a
right to a jury trial in the first instance. State v. Holliday, 280 A.2d 333, 338
(R.I. 1971); R.I. DIST. CT. R. CRIM. P. 23. However, a criminal defendant may
also elect to have the case first heard in the District Court, and, if he is
aggrieved by the judge’s decision in a criminal case, he is then entitled to a de
novo jury trial in the Superior Court on the misdemeanor charge itself (but
not the adjudication of violation). R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-22-1; R.I. DIST. CT. R.
CRIM. P. 23; State v. Avila, 415 A.2d 180, 182 (R.I. 1980) (citing State v. Gill,
342 A.2d 256, 257 (R.I. 1975)).
31. If the defendant expresses a reluctance to resolve the new case at the
time of their violation hearing in Superior Court, the court will often offer a
third choice, the so-called “violation-only offer.” This allows the defendant to
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correctly, this practice—commonly referred to as “wrapping” the
new charge in with the violation allegation32—provides both the
state and the defendant with the ability to efficiently resolve
several matters on mutually acceptable terms. Wrapping the
cases is especially useful when the new charge is based on
substantial evidence that would likely allow the state to secure a
guilty verdict after trial. However, because the violation offer is
often conditioned on the defendant’s admission to the criminal
offense, this process also permits the state to secure a conviction
in cases where the evidence is weak or unsupported.33
Back in the courthouse cellblock on the day of the
probation-violation hearing, two weeks after Dennis was
initially held, you explain to him that, at a trial, he would
be allowed to present an absolute defense to the charge of
simple assault, based on his claim of self-defense. The
evidence against him, the complainant John’s testimony,
can be contradicted by Sara’s testimony. The state’s other
civilian witness, John’s friend “Nick,” who was with him
at the bar that night, has moved to California and will not
return to testify in the case. Thus, Nick’s damaging
statement to the police cannot come into evidence at a
trial, as it is hearsay and its admission would violate the
confrontation principles outlined in Crawford.34 You
explain to Dennis that, even if he loses his first trial before
the District Court judge, he has a right to appeal the case
to the Superior Court for a full jury trial where he can
present his case to a jury of his peers.35 At the jury trial,

admit violation and receive an agreed-upon term of imprisonment on the
probation case alone. In a situation like this, the new charge would proceed
independently of the violation. This practice is rarely used in the District
Court. In the Superior Court, sometimes—although not always—the term of
imprisonment included in the “violation-only offer” is either equal to or
greater than the one included with the wrap offer. This leverage technique is
not universally employed, but it is all-too-frequently witnessed by the
criminal practitioners who handle violation cases with regularity. See
Horwitz, supra note 23, at 766.
32. See, e.g., THIRD MEETING, supra note 28, at 21 (“Half of those on
probation are reconvicted/wrapped within three years.”).
33. See Horwitz, supra note 23, at 766.
34. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
35. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-22-1.
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you tell him, each and every one of the jurors would have
to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he
assaulted John first, and not in self-defense, in order to
find him guilty of misdemeanor assault.
But, you warn, the violation hearing is a different matter.
There is no appeal to a jury; there is only the judge. You
explain that the police officer, a trained and confident
witness, will be allowed to testify to Nick’s inculpatory
statement if the court finds there is “good cause” to admit
this hearsay evidence.36 Even if Sara’s testimony gives the
judge some doubt about the validity of John’s claim, the
judge can still find Dennis to be a violator if she is
reasonably satisfied that he was not of good behavior that
night.37 After all, you remind Dennis, the judge does not
have to find that he committed the assault in order to keep
him in prison.38 While there is no evidence that Dennis
was severely intoxicated that evening, you remind him
that he had admitted to the responding officer that he
“might have had one too many” in the bar. Could this be
considered bad behavior? You cannot say for sure. You
also remind him that Sara will testify, and Dennis does
not deny, that he and John were involved in a heated
verbal argument before John threw the first punch. Is this
verbal sparring a failure to keep the peace and be of good
behavior? Dennis looks to you for answers, but you can
only remind him that if he loses, then the judge can
sentence him to up to one year of prison, the maximum
sentence allowed on the original resisting arrest charge.39
You then present him with the state’s offer: If Dennis
36. State v. Bernard, 925 A.2d 936, 939 (R.I. 2007) (citing State v.
DeRoche, 389 A.2d 1229, 1234 (1978)).
37. See State v. Sylvia, 871 A.2d 954, 957 (R.I. 2005) (citing State v.
Anderson, 705 A.2d 996, 997 (R.I. 1997)).
38. See State v. Gautier, 774 A.2d 882, 887 (R.I. 2001) (“It is not the role
of the hearing justice to determine the validity of the specific charge that
formed the basis of the violation.”).
39. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-10(b) (allowing imprisonment for up to one
year following a conviction for resisting arrest); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9
(“Upon a determination that the defendant has violated the terms and
conditions of his or her probation the court . . . may . . . impose a sentence if
one has not been previously imposed . . .”).
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enters a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of simple
assault, he will be placed on probation for an additional
year, with the special condition that he enter counseling
for alcohol treatment. If he accepts that offer, the judge
has agreed to sentence him to time served on the violation
and release him from prison that day. You warn him that
if he takes this deal, however, he will not only face
additional probation and required treatment, but he also
will have two misdemeanor convictions on his record,
making his criminal record now inexpungable under
Rhode Island law.40 That means, you tell him, that no
matter how many positive things he accomplishes in the
future, these convictions will haunt him for the rest of his
life.
At first he protests—he did not assault anyone, he was just
defending himself! He does not want to plead guilty to the
charge. But then he closes his eyes and his shoulders sag.
He tells you that he might be able to get his job back if he
is released today; Ana has spoken to his boss, who has not
replaced him yet but cannot wait much longer. Ana is due
to give birth in a few weeks; he knows he needs to be out to
help her, and he does not want to miss the birth of his
baby. “What would you do?” he asks as he sighs and
opens his eyes and tells you to prepare the paperwork.
II. RHODE ISLAND’S UNREASONABLY LOW PROBATION VIOLATION
STANDARDS

Most criminal defense attorneys have had clients like Dennis,
maybe dozens or even hundreds of them. As both lawyers and
defendants are aware, the consequences of a probation revocation
can be just as serious as another criminal conviction, with judges
often doling out lengthy prison sentences after hearings.41
Therefore, the extremely low standard of proof employed at these

40. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-2 (allowing only first offenders to file a
motion for expungement).
41. See, e.g., State v. Raso, 80 A.3d 33, 41 (R.I. 2013) (reviewing an
adjudication in which a judge found the defendant to be a violator and
sentenced him to serve twenty-five years of previously imposed suspended
sentences).
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hearings is a key component of Rhode Island’s imbalanced
probation system, and as such, a natural starting point for reform.
As discussed, a hearing judge is not tasked with finding, to a
degree of reasonable satisfaction, whether the defendant
committed the crime alleged, an undertaking that would require
the finding of specific elements. The question, rather, is whether
the defendant “fail[ed] to keep the peace and remain on good
behavior”42—an indefinite touchstone that leaves a probationer
vulnerable to violation based on a wide variety of undefined noncriminal behavior.43 In other words, a lack of evidence as to
whether a probationer committed a specific crime may be
compensated by evidence that he or she engaged in tangential,
non-criminal—arguably “bad”—behavior.44
Thus, revocation
turns on a question with not one, but two pliant variables,
referred to in this Article as the “legal” burden of proof and the
“factual” burden of proof, respectively: Is the hearing judge (1)
reasonably satisfied (2) that the probationer failed to keep the

42. State v. McCarthy, 945 A.2d 318, 326 (R.I. 2008) (citing State v.
Forbes, 925 A.2d 929, 934 (R.I. 2007)).
43. See, e.g., State v. Pitts, 960 A.2d 240, 242, 246 (R.I. 2008)
(“Irrespective of whether [the defendant] could be found guilty of disorderly
conduct, there was sufficient evidence for the hearing justice to conclude that
he had violated his probation by failing to keep the peace and remain on good
behavior . . . [by] engag[ing] in a sexual act in a vehicle on a public highway,
at a time when he was on probation for prior sex offenses.”). Indeed, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court has provided little in the way of guidance on
what non-criminal behavior would not amount to a failure to keep the peace
and be of good behavior. See, e.g., McCarthy, 945 A.2d at 328 (avoiding issue
of whether non-criminal possession of women’s underwear in coat liner or
driving by the home of sex offender counselor amounted to a failure to keep
the peace and be of good behavior). But see id. at 329 n.9 (Flaherty, J.,
dissenting) (noting that although defendant’s possession of female
undergarments as a twice-convicted sex offender was “downright disturbing,”
it was “neither a violation of the law nor a breach of a condition of
probation”).
44. See, e.g., State v. Lamoureux, 58 A.3d 189, 193–94 (R.I. 2013)
(affirming finding of violation based on evidence that defendant had placed
“himself into unseemly and probably criminal activities within [twenty-four]
hours of each other”; hearing justice did not have to determine whether
defendant actually assaulted anyone (alteration in original)); State v.
Gautier, 774 A.2d 882, 887 (R.I. 2001) (reversing a finding of no violation
where there was evidence that defendant was present at the scene of the
murder, failed to report the murder, and fled from a police officer; hearing
justice was not required to find that defendant was guilty of murder).
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peace and be of good behavior?45 When mapped against the
national landscape, Rhode Island’s exceptionally discretionary
standard is an outlier.
In an effort to find guidance from other states, Section II.A
provides a brief overview of the burdens of proof used at probation
revocation hearings in other jurisdictions. Section II.B examines
potential avenues of reform to Rhode Island’s revocation
standards, including a recently proposed amendment to Rule 32(f)
of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure
that would increase the legal burden of proof to “fair
preponderance of the evidence.”46 Section II.B also recommends
replacing the current factual burden of proof, “keeping the peace
and being of good behavior,” with a framework that allows for
revocation only when a probationer commits a new crime or
violates a specific condition of probation. Section II.C discusses
two pragmatic sentencing reforms that target Rhode Island’s
disproportionately long probationary sentences: (1) a system of
earned compliance credits for probationary periods (also referred
to as good time credits), and (2) probationary sentence limits for
certain categories of crimes, a measure that has recently been
proposed by a majority of current Rhode Island Superior Court
Justices.47
A. Legal Burdens of Proof Across the Country
Notably, there is no constitutionally mandated burden of
proof at a probation violation hearing. While the United States
Supreme Court has laid out minimum due process requirements
for parole revocation hearings and probation revocation hearings
in Morrissey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, respectively, it
has not mandated any standard of proof for such hearings.48
45. See State v. Ditren, 126 A.3d 414, 418 (R.I. 2015) (citing State v.
Delarosa, 39 A.3d 1043, 1049 (R.I. 2012)).
46. See Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra
note 21, at 1.
47. Id. at 4.
48. 411 U.S. 778, 781–82, 786 (1973) (probation revocation proceedings);
408 U.S. 471, 482–89 (1972) (parole revocation proceedings). Minimum due
process requirements include:
“(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole;
(b) disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of evidence against him;
(c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and
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However, its refusal to require the “full panoply of rights”49
afforded to defendants in criminal proceedings implies that
violations need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.50 In the
absence of a clear constitutional direction, the states have formed
a rough bell curve, with the majority of states using the middling
“preponderance of the evidence” burden of proof employed in most
civil cases, and the others adopting higher or lower standards.51
These standards of proof, ordered from the lowest to highest
burden, include Rhode Island’s “reasonable satisfaction”52
standard on the extreme low end, followed by “preponderance of
the evidence,”53 “clear and convincing evidence,”54 and, finally, the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard55 topping the high end of
the spectrum.56
documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good
cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and detached’
hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which
need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement
by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking [probation or] parole.”
Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786 (alterations in original) (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S.
at 489).
49. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480.
50. See Piar, supra note 24, at 127 (“In neither Morrissey nor Gagnon . . .
did the Court address what standard of proof should apply in this less-thancriminal proceeding, thus leaving the matter to the states and their
individual codes of procedure.”).
51. Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia employ what amounts
to a preponderance of the evidence standard for probation revocation
hearings. See infra text accompanying notes 65–66.
52. See, e.g., State v. Ditren, 126 A.3d 414, 418 (R.I. 2015) (“[T]he state
need only show that ‘reasonably satisfactory’ evidence supports a finding that
the defendant has violated his or her probation.” (quoting State v. Delarosa,
39 A.3d 1043, 1049 (R.I. 2012))).
53. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-32(d) (West 2012 & Supp. 2015)
(“No such revocation shall be ordered, except upon consideration of the whole
record and unless such violation is established by the introduction of reliable
and probative evidence and by a preponderance of the evidence.”).
54. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM. P. § 27.04 (allowing probationers a right to
“a revocation hearing to determine whether clear and convincing evidence of
a probation violation exists and whether probation should be revoked”).
55. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-206 (2013) (requiring proof beyond
a reasonable doubt where the violation is a new criminal offense).
56. South Carolina and Virginia do not have explicitly-stated burdens
that easily fall into such categories. In South Carolina, although there must
be “sufficient evidence” establishing that the defendant violated probation,
the courts have not made clear what quantum of evidence is “sufficient.” See
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While there is no case law defining exactly what “reasonable
satisfaction” requires in Rhode Island, it is clear that it is not only
less exacting than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard used in
criminal prosecutions, but also lower than the preponderance of
evidence standard employed in civil actions.57 Indeed, the burden
is perhaps most akin to the burden of production of a defendant
seeking an affirmative defense: namely, the burden to point to
some evidence.58
State v. Allen, 634 S.E.2d 653, 655 (S.C. 2006). Similarly, in Virginia, “the
court may revoke the suspension of sentence for any cause the court deems
sufficient,” an evidentiary determination firmly within the discretion of the
court. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-306(A) (2008); Marshall v. Commonwealth, 116
S.E.2d 270, 273 (Va. 1960).
57. Although a hearing judge must weigh evidence and assess
credibility, “[t]he burden of proof in a probation-revocation hearing . . . is
considerably lower than in a criminal case; the state is required to show only
that defendant is a violator by reasonably satisfactory evidence.” State v.
Forbes, 925 A.2d 929, 934 (R.I. 2007) (emphasis added); see also State v.
Sparks, 667 A.2d 1250, 1252 (R.I. 1995) (rejecting argument that a prior
inconsistent statement was insufficient to support a finding of violation, and
citing state’s argument that the “‘reasonably satisfied’ standard of a
probation-revocation hearing allows an even more relaxed burden of proof
than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard required in a civil case”).
One Superior Court justice has even suggested that “reasonable satisfaction”
requires less proof than probable cause. State v. Reis, No. P2-03-2726A, 2012
WL 3638892, at *14 (R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012) (“The same way the State
does not need to prove a violation beyond a reasonable doubt, the State need
not prove that there exists probable cause to determine a finding of
violation.”).
58. Compare State v. Bouffard, 945 A.2d 305, 310 (R.I. 2008) (“The
burden of proof on the state at a probation violation hearing is much lower
than that which exists in a criminal trial—the state need only show that
‘reasonably satisfactory’ evidence supports a finding that the defendant
violated his or her probation.”), with State v. Verrecchia, 766 A.2d 377, 387–
88 (R.I. 2001) (“A court assessing the sufficiency of the defendant’s
presentation on this score (that is, whether ‘some evidence’ has been
adduced) must be able to find more than a scintilla of support to justify such
an instruction.”). The standard is arguably so low that it only requires the
state to produce evidence of violation, not to persuade the trier of fact. As the
Court of Appeals of Maryland put it: “We have great difficulty in
conceptualizing how a reasonable satisfaction standard can meaningfully
operate below the level of a preponderance of the evidence while the State
would still bear the burden to produce evidence and the burden of
persuasion.” Wink v. State, 563 A.2d 414, 419 (Md. 1989) (emphasis added).
Given the extremely deferential standard of review on appeal, it is difficult to
determine whether, in practice, there is any amount of evidence that would
be insufficient to support a finding. See State v. English, 21 A.3d 403, 407
(R.I. 2011) (stating that appellate review “is limited to considering whether
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Only five other states utilize a burden of proof similar to
Rhode Island’s: Alabama,59 Nevada,60 North Carolina,61 South
Dakota,62 and Washington.63
Of course, none of these
jurisdictions has revocation landscapes identical to that of Rhode
Island, and other principles, not applicable in Rhode Island, help
mitigate the effects of the low standard in other states.64
Three other states—Delaware, Idaho, and Maryland—use a
the hearing justice acted arbitrarily or capriciously in finding a violation”
(quoting State v. Sylvia, 871 A.2d 954, 957 (R.I. 2005))).
59.
Sams v. State, 48 So. 3d 665, 669 (Ala. 2010) (“[T]he trial court need
‘only be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the probationer has
violated the conditions of his probation.’” (quoting Ex parte J.J.D., 778 So. 2d
240, 242 (Ala. 2000))).
60. In Lewis v. State, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed reasonable
satisfaction as the appropriate standard of proof for a violation hearing. 529
P.2d 796, 797 (Nev. 1974). In Dail v. State, the petitioner asked, to no avail,
that the court reject this standard in favor of adopting a preponderance of the
evidence standard. 610 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Nev. 1980).
61. State v. Hewett, 154 S.E.2d 476, 480 (N.C. 1967) (stating that the
evidence must “be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge . . . that the
defendant has willfully violated a valid condition of probation or that the
defendant has violated without lawful excuse a valid condition upon which
the sentence was suspended”); see also State v. Harris, 646 S.E.2d 526, 529
(N.C. 2007).
62. State v. Beck, 619 N.W.2d 247, 249 (S.D. 2000) (“All that is required
is the evidence and facts be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge that the
conduct of the probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions
of probation.”).
63. City of Aberdeen v. Regan, 239 P.3d 1102, 1104 (Wash. 2010) (“In
order to revoke probation, ‘[a]ll that is required is that the evidence and facts
be such as to reasonably satisfy the court that the probationer has breached a
condition under which he was granted probation.’” (quoting Standlee v.
Smith, 518 P.2d 721, 723 (Wash. 1974))).
64. For example, in Alabama, “[i]t is well settled that hearsay evidence
may not form the sole basis for revoking an individual’s probation.” Goodgain
v. State, 755 So. 2d 591, 592 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999); see also Clayton v. State,
669 So. 2d 220, 222 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (“The use of hearsay as the sole
means of proving a violation of a condition of probation denies a probationer
the right to confront and to cross-examine the persons originating
information that forms the basis of the revocation.”). Additionally, in North
Carolina, probation can be revoked only where the probationer (1) commits a
new crime; (2) absconds supervision; or (3) violates a specific condition of
probation after serving two periods of “confinement in response to violation”
for committing technical violations. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1344(a) (2013);
State v. Nolen, 743 S.E.2d 729, 730 & n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013). Unlike Rhode
Island, probation in North Carolina cannot be revoked for something as
vague as “fail[ing] to keep the peace and to remain on good behavior.” State
v. Gautier, 774 A.2d 882, 887 (R.I. 2001).
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reasonable satisfaction standard, but apply it as preponderance of
the evidence.65
Indeed, the preponderance of the evidence
standard is far and away the most prevalent burden of proof, with
thirty-three other states and the District of Columbia requiring it
at revocation hearings—by statute, court procedural or
evidentiary rule, or court decision.66 Two states, Minnesota and
65. A leading case in Delaware, cited in most violation decisions in that
state, echoed the Fifth Circuit in stating:
A judge in [a probation revocation] proceeding need not have
evidence that would establish beyond a reasonable doubt guilt of
criminal offenses. All that is required is that the evidence and facts
be such as to reasonably satisfy the judge that the conduct of the
probationer has not been as good as required by the conditions of
probation.
Brown v. State, 249 A.2d 269, 272 (Del. 1968) (quoting Manning v. United
States, 161 F.2d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 1947)). In more recent decisions, however,
the reasonable satisfaction standard has been applied as a preponderance
standard. For example, in Weaver v. State, the court stated that “the trial
court has broad authority to find a probation violation applying a
preponderance of the evidence standard, in contrast to the standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt required for the initial conviction.” 779 A.2d 254,
259 (Del. 2001). In Idaho, although the state must provide “satisfactory
proof” of a violation, the standard requires that the prosecution present
“substantial evidence” of the violation, which suggests that a preponderance
standard is actually required. State v. Rose, 171 P.3d 253, 256 (Idaho 2007).
Additionally, in Maryland, if the court is “reasonably satisfied by a
preponderance of the evidence that a violation has occurred,” then the
standard of proof has been met and probation may be revoked. Gibson v.
State, 616 A.2d 877, 879 (Md. 1992); accord Hammonds v. State, 80 A.3d 698,
703–04 (Md. 2013); Baynard v. State, 569 A.2d 652, 655 (Md. 1990); Wink v.
State, 563 A.2d 414, 415 (Md. 1989). In other words, as applied in Maryland,
the reasonable satisfaction standard is equivalent to the preponderance of
the evidence standard. Wink, 563 A.2d at 415; Robert B. v. State, 998 A.2d
909, 919 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010).
66. See ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 27.8(b)(3); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-93-308(d)
(2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-32(d) (West 2012 & Supp. 2015); GA. CODE
ANN. § 42-8-34.1(b) (2014); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-6-4(c) (2014); IND. CODE §
35-38-2-3(f) (2012); ME. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1206 (2006 & Supp. 2015); MICH. CT.
R. 6.445(E)(1); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-203(6)(a) (2014); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 410.70(3) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35311(e)(1) (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 302(a)(4) (2008 & Supp. 2015); WYO.
R. CRIM. P. 39(a)(5); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 32(f)(3)(B); Holton v. State, 602 P.2d
1228, 1238 (Alaska 1979); People v. Rodriguez, 795 P.2d 783, 785 (Cal. 1990);
Harris v. United States, 612 A.2d 198, 203 (D.C. 1992); Russell v. State, 982
So. 2d 642, 646 (Fla. 2008); Calvert v. State, 310 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Iowa
1981); State v. Gumfory, 135 P.3d 1191, 1193 (Kan. 2006); Barker v.
Commonwealth, 379 S.W.3d 116, 123 (Ky. 2012); Commonwealth v. Wilcox,
841 N.E.2d 1240, 1246 (Mass. 2006); State v. Oliver, 856 So. 2d 328, 332
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Nebraska, have split the difference between preponderance of the
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, adopting clear and
convincing evidence as the burden of proof at revocation
hearings.67
New Mexico also falls somewhere between
preponderance of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt,
requiring a violation of probation to be proven with “reasonable
certainty.”68
Three states—Colorado, Hawaii, and Louisiana—go above
what is constitutionally necessary, using a reasonable doubt
standard, at least when the revocation is based on the alleged
commission of a crime.69 For example, in Hawaii, legislation
requires that probation “shall” be revoked upon conviction of a
felony, and “may” be revoked upon conviction of a crime other
than a felony.70 This scheme requires prosecutors to proceed on
the underlying charge first, negating any “proxy trial” problem
posed by revocation proceedings when the basis of the revocation
is a new criminal charge.71 Similarly, in Louisiana, probation
may be revoked upon a misdemeanor or felony conviction.72
Lastly, Colorado has an explicit two-tier system. When the
violation alleged is a criminal act, the prosecution has the burden
of establishing the violation beyond a reasonable doubt unless the

(Miss. 2003); Turner v. State, 784 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State
v. Carlson, 767 A.2d 421, 426 (N.H. 2001); State v. Lavoy, 614 A.2d 1077,
1080 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); State v. Garner, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas
No. 15-AP-06-003, 2016-Ohio-461, ¶ 3; Tilden v. State, 306 P.3d 554, 556
(Okla. Crim. App. 2013); State v. Donovan, 751 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Or. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Brown, 469 A.2d 1371, 1373 n.2 (Pa. 1983); Hacker v.
State, 389 S.W.3d 860, 864–65 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Layton City v.
Stevenson, 337 P.3d 242, 244 (Utah 2014); State v. Brown, 600 S.E.2d 561,
564 (W. Va. 2004); State ex rel. Thompson v. Riveland, 326 N.W.2d 768, 771
(Wis. 1982).
67. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.04; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2267 (Reissue 2008).
68. See, e.g., State v. Guthrie, 257 P.3d 904, 909 (N.M. 2011); State v.
Brusenhan, 438 P.2d 174, 176 (N.M. Ct. App. 1968).
69. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-206(3) (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706625(3) (2014) (requiring conviction if a new crime is the basis of a probation
violation); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 901 (2005 & Supp. 2013) (same).
70. HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-625(3) (“The court shall revoke probation if
the defendant . . . has been convicted of a felony. The court may revoke the
suspension of sentence or probation if the defendant has been convicted of
another crime other a felony.”).
71. See Horwitz, supra note 23, at 784–88.
72. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 901.
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defendant has already been convicted of the offense.73 When the
violation alleged is a technical violation of a condition of probation
rather than a criminal offense, the prosecution has the burden of
establishing the violation by a preponderance of the evidence.74
B. Modifying Rhode Island’s Legal and Factual Burden of Proof
1.

Legal Burden of Proof

The proposed amendment to Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court
Rules of Criminal Procedure, still pending at the time of this
Article’s publication, provides that “[n]o revocation shall occur
unless the State establishes by a fair preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant breached a condition of his/her
probation or deferred sentence or failed to keep the peace and or
remain on good behavior.”75 If the Rhode Island Supreme Court
approves this proposal, Rhode Island will join the majority of
states that require a hearing court to find a violation by the
preponderance of the evidence before revoking probation.
A higher legal burden of proof, especially as it applies to
violations based on new crimes, lessens the state’s ability to use
revocation hearings or the threat of revocations as relatively quick
and easy mechanisms to imprison a person under circumstances
where it would be difficult or impossible to obtain a conviction.
The beyond a reasonable doubt standard, though currently used
by only a few states in revocation hearings, would best safeguard
against the “proxy trial” problem.76 The adoption of a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard as to probation violations based on new
crimes also would alleviate the innocence concerns that Rhode
73. COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-206(3) (“[T]he commission of a criminal
offense must be established beyond a reasonable doubt unless the probationer
has been convicted thereof in a criminal proceeding.”).
74. Id. (stating that, except for criminal offenses, “the prosecution has
the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the violation of
a condition of probation”).
75. Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note
21, at 1.
76. See supra notes 23–27 and accompanying text. Of course, imposition
of a high burden of proof could not altogether eliminate the proxy trial
problem. As long as revocation hearings continue to be subject to a relaxed
version of the rules of evidence and allow the admission of illegally obtained
evidence, it will remain easier to prosecute via Rule 32(f) than by criminal
charge. See Horwitz, supra note 23, at 785.
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Island General Laws section 12-19-18(b) intended to address.77
Finally, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard would be easily
workable, given the judges’ familiarity with applying the standard
in criminal bench trials.
On the other hand, some have expressed concern that judges
would be less willing to offer the benefit of probation at the time of
the initial sentencing if probation were too difficult to revoke.78
Furthermore, if probation violations were more difficult to prove,
prosecutors might also be reluctant to offer a probationary
sentence as a part of a plea deal. Of course, defendants’ incentives
should also be examined when considering the optimal burden of
proof at violation hearings. Many defendants may be better
served by taking a short period of incarceration over a longer
period of probation and suspended time, because when a
defendant is on probation, any and every allegation of wrongdoing—no matter how minor or specious—could expose the
defendant to the entirety of the longer suspended sentence.79
Assuming probation is an effective rehabilitation tool,80 an
77. See Ellen Liberman, Guilty, Even While Innocent, R.I. MONTHLY 31,
31–35 (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.rimonthly.com/Rhode-IslandMonthly/December-2008/Guilty-Even-While-Innocent/. Section 12-19-18(b) of
the Rhode Island General Laws, enacted by the General Assembly in 2010,
provides for an end to imprisonment when a person previously violated on
probation is not ultimately convicted of the criminal offense that formed the
basis for the violation. See John Hill, R.I. Modifies Law on Probationers After
Four-Year Campaign, PROVIDENCE J., Jun. 20, 2010, at A1. In 2012, Rhode
Island Superior Court Justice William E. Carnes held that the statute was
unconstitutional. State v. Reis, No. P2-03-2726A, 2012 WL 3638892, at *18
(R.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2012). Although that particular case has since
become moot, the Rhode Island Public Defender’s Office appealed that ruling
in connection with another case that is now pending in the Rhode Island
Supreme Court.
78. See, e.g., Campbell v. Aderhold, 36 F.2d 366, 367 (N.D. Ga. 1929)
(“Unless the broad discretion to revoke be fully recognized, much greater
caution will have to be exercised in extending this grace originally, and the
benefits of the act will become greatly restricted.”); Piar, supra note 24, at
128–29 (citing People v. Rodriguez, 795 P.2d 783, 788–89 (Cal. 1990)).
79. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-9.
80. While courts often view probationary sentences as a means to ensure
that a defendant receives needed counseling or treatment in the community,
it is not the only vehicle by which this goal can be accomplished. This Article
omits extensive reference to several alternative sentencing programs existing
in Rhode Island. The largest of those programs, the Rhode Island Adult Drug
Court, has reported a high degree of success in lowering recidivism rates
among recent offenders; however, given acceptance parameters which limit
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optimum burden of proof would balance both the state’s interest in
keeping the community safe and the offender’s interest in his or
her continued liberty.81
Most states have concluded that the preponderance of the
evidence burden provides this happy medium.82 Similar to the

entry to those without drug distribution and other charges, it accepts only a
fraction of those who could be served by such a program. NATHANIEL LEPP ET
AL., COUNCIL ON CRIME PREVENTION, REPORT ON ADULT DRUG COURT:
ELIGIBILITY, PROCEDURE, AND FUNDING 3, 6–7 (2007), http://www.opendoorsri.
org/sites/default/files/ccpdrugcourt.pdf. Programs like the Adult Drug Court,
which directly minister to illicit drug users accused of crimes, are sorely
needed: Rhode Island ranks as one of the states with the greatest number of
individuals needing but not receiving treatment for illicit drug use, the
second highest percentage of illicit drug abusers in the country, and the
highest incidence of illicit drug abuse among those who are 18–25 years old.
Id. at 2–3.
81. The judicial system is not perfect. In all types of cases, regardless of
the burden of proof, there will be some decisions or verdicts that reflect the
factual truth, and there will also be some false positives or false negatives.
See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Getting it Right: Uncertainty and Error in the
New Disparate Treatment Paradigm, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1996); see also
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). The particular burden of proof
employed will determine whether the errors will skew towards false negative
(here, a finding of no violation when one actually occurred) or false positive (a
finding of violation when the defendant was innocent). On the one hand,
because the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard is difficult to meet,
convictions should, in theory, skew towards false negatives. The high
standard thus prioritizes the interest of the defendant over the community.
By employing this standard in criminal cases, we have decided that, as a
society, it is more important that a guilty person go free than an innocent
person be punished. On the other hand, in a civil trial where monetary
awards rather than personal liberties are at stake, a plaintiff is only required
to prove his or her case by a “preponderance of the evidence.” E.g.,
Addington, 441 U.S. at 423. In civil cases, “[t]he risk of error is divided
equally between plaintiff and defendant because the risk of a false positive is
equal to that of a false negative.” Chambers, supra, at 6. In other words, as
a society, we have determined that the harm of a truly at-fault plaintiff
escaping civil liability is nearly equal to the harm of a plaintiff being wrongly
held financially accountable. The current burden of proof at a revocation
hearing, skewed in favor of the state, ensures that false positives will prevail.
Theoretically speaking, the current standard actually allows more innocent
probationers to be imprisoned than guilty ones to go free.
82. See sources cited supra note 66. Preponderance of the evidence was
also the uniform standard proposed by the American Bar Association in 1970.
See AM. BAR ASS’N PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note
24, § 5.4(a), at 67 (“[T]he government should have the burden of establishing
the occurrence of the violation by a preponderance of the evidence in those
cases where the facts are contested.”).
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beyond a reasonable doubt standard, it is a workable burden,
familiar to judges from civil litigation.83 Additionally, unlike the
burden of reasonable satisfaction in use at the time of this writing,
preponderance of the evidence is specific, requiring a certain
quantum of proof: “[P]roof which leads the [factfinder] to find that
the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its
nonexistence.”84 Conversely, it appears that even hearing justices
ascribe different definitions to the term “reasonable satisfaction,”
leaving
the
probationer—and
his
lawyer—with
little
understanding of the quantum of evidence that will satisfy the
state’s burden at a violation hearing.85 The Superior Court’s
proposed modification to the legal burden of proof, if adopted,
would be a welcome recalibration of our probationary system,
better balancing the public’s safety interest with the probationers’
liberty interest. While it is likely that the state will still meet its
burden in the majority of cases, more probationers may prevail in
very weak cases.86 This effect will trickle down to bail decisions
83. Some states have concluded that the preponderance of the evidence
standard should apply precisely because a violation hearing is civil in nature.
See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 420 N.E.2d 1239, 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
Although the Rhode Island Supreme Court has often recited that the hearing
is a civil proceeding, it has not applied the same rationale to the burden of
proof. See, e.g., State v. Gautier, 950 A.2d 400, 408 (R.I. 2008) (“A probationviolation hearing is a civil proceeding to determine whether a probationer has
kept the peace and been of good behavior . . . .”).
84. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE § 339(a), at 794 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972).
85. The “reasonable satisfaction” burden was described by one hearing
justice as an “extremely low standard that does not take much to satisfy.”
State v. Rioux, 708 A.2d 895, 898 (R.I. 1998). In Rioux, the hearing justice
revealed just how indefinable the standard really is, quipping that he could
be “reasonably satisfied by a hot dog on occasion.” Id. We recognize that
other Rhode Island trial justices, troubled by the idea of depriving an
individual of their liberty on an “extremely low” standard of proof, have
interpreted the “reasonable satisfaction” burden somewhat more rigorously.
The difference in interpretation alone demonstrates the malleable and
amorphous nature of the current standard. Cf. State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d
270, 278 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (applying preponderance of the evidence
standard and finding that a “‘some competent evidence standard’ is too
nebulous to apply to probation revocation”).
86. Georgia provides an example of a state where an increase in the
burden of proof at violation hearings resulted in an actual change in practice.
There, the state legislature codified the burden of proof at a violation
hearing, increasing it from “slight evidence” to a preponderance of the
evidence in 1988. 1988 Ga. Laws 1911–12, § 1 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. §
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and negotiated admissions, providing defendants newfound
leverage in cases with limited or problematic evidence.
2.

Factual Burden of Proof

Realistically, however, any increase in the burden of proof in
Rhode Island would be undermined by the revocation hearing’s
focus on whether the probationer failed to keep the peace and be
of good behavior.87 In other words, as the legal burden ratchets
up, violations can nonetheless be found on factual grounds more
and more distant than those articulated in the criminal complaint
attached to the Rule 32(f) petition. Taking Dennis’s case as an
example, there might not be proof to support, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that Dennis threw the first punch in the bar fight.
However, the judge may have nonetheless found by a
preponderance of evidence that he had committed the noncriminal, but arguably “bad,” behavior of consuming too much
alcohol that evening or engaging in a heated barroom argument,
and declare a violation on one of those grounds alone, resulting in
the imposition of all or part of Dennis’s suspended sentence.88
42-8-34.1(b) (2014)). Several years later, the Georgia Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of a trial court that revoked a defendant’s probation
when there was only “slight evidence” to suggest that the defendant had
violated probation by being in a home in the presence of narcotics, even
though this would have been sufficient under Georgia’s previous standard.
Anderson v. State, 442 S.E.2d 268, 268 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
87. The Committee Notes for the proposed amendment to Superior Court
Rule 32(f) explicitly reaffirms the good behavior requirement:
In addition, the amendment reflects and recites the Rhode Island
Supreme Court’s settled rule that revocation should not be
determined by whether the defendant violated any offense which
may form the basis of the violation allegation; rather, the “‘sole
purpose of a probation violation hearing is for the trial justice to
determine whether the conditions of probation’—’keeping the peace
and remaining on good behavior’—have been violated.’”
Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note 21, at 1
(quoting State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479, 499 (R.I. 2013)).
88. For example, in State v. Lamoureux, the hearing justice declined to
find whether the probationer had slapped, grabbed, pushed or otherwise
accosted the complaining witness, or stabbed her brother, and instead based
his finding of violation on the probationer acting in an “untoward manner
towards [the complainant] on at least two occasions” and “put[ting] himself
into unseemly and probably criminal activities within [twenty-four] hours of
each other,” including participating in a backyard “melee.” Transcript of
Bench Decision at 66–67, State v. Lamoureux, No. P1/93-2785A (R.I. Super.
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As any criminal defense attorney can attest, a major
deficiency of the “keep the peace and be of good behavior”
standard is that it fails to provide notice of what, in particular,
violates this requirement. Is it associating with other people on
probation, whether or not you know they are on probation? Is it
being in the vicinity of drugs, guns, or stolen property, even if you
are not aware of your proximity to such items? Is it being at a
party where a fight happens to break out? Is it running from the
police? Is it raising your voice in an argument with your spouse?
Is it using drugs or alcohol? Indeed, an Assistant Public Defender
recalled one occasion where the state sought to revoke an
intellectually disabled client’s probation for using his allowance
money from his mother for something other than the promised
purpose.
In the absence of legislative or judicial reform, the good
behavior standard is ripe for constitutional attack.89 As the
United States Supreme Court has made clear, a law is void for
vagueness if it fails to “give the person of ordinary intelligence a
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited.”90 Such is the
Ct. Dec. 7, 2011), aff’d, 58 A.3d 189, 193–94 (R.I. 2013). Moreover, in Rhode
Island, the state may rely on any allegation of arguably “bad behavior”
contained within the 32(f) petition when seeking a revocation of probation.
State v. Znosko, 755 A.2d 832, 835 (R.I. 2000). This allows the state to rest a
revocation argument on minute examples of imperfect behavior, further
discouraging defendants from challenging violation allegations even when
the majority––or the entirety––of the accompanying criminal claims are false
or unsupported by the evidence.
89. See, e.g., Fiona Doherty, Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and
the Meaning of Recidivism, 104 GEO. L.J. 291, 303, 305 (2016) (describing the
lack of constitutional challenges to “be good” conditions as “surprisingly
rare . . . despite the strong basis for objection,” perhaps because these
“conditions become embedded in the routine landscape of the law”).
90. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972); State v.
Authelet, 385 A.2d 642, 643–44 (R.I. 1978) (stating the due process
prohibition against vagueness is animated by fairness concerns); see also
United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A
probationer . . . has a separate due process right to conditions of supervised
release that are sufficiently clear to inform him of what conduct will result in
his being returned to prison.”); United States v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839, 843
(7th Cir. 1999) (“A condition of supervised release is unconstitutionally vague
if it would not afford a person of reasonable intelligence with sufficient notice
as to the conduct prohibited.”); Birzon v. King, 469 F.2d 1241, 1243 (2d Cir.
1972); Hunter v. State, 883 N.E.2d 1161, 1163 (Ind. 2008) (“Like statutes
defining penal offenses, the language [of a condition of probation] must be
such that it describes with clarity and particularity the misconduct that will
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case with Rhode Island’s factual burden of proof, which, like other
“good behavior” standards, is “so broad” as to “defy basic due
process requirements.”91 Nothing in Rhode Island caselaw has
limited or defined this all-encompassing language, leaving
probationers and attorneys alike in the dark about the precise
conduct prohibited.92
This amorphous standard poses at least two serious risks to
the fair administration of our probationary system: (1) that “the
innocent may be trapped by inadequate warning of what the state
forbids,” and (2) that those who administer the law may
arbitrarily or discriminatorily enforce the law, perhaps even
unintentionally.93
Other states avoid these constitutional
vagueness problems by specifically providing, whether through
judicial common law or legislation, that probation can only be
revoked when a probationer violates an explicit condition of
probation or commits a new crime. In Indiana, for example, “good
behavior” has been judicially defined as “lawful conduct.”94 And,
in North Carolina, recent legislation explicitly limits the grounds
of revocation to circumstances where the probationer: (1) commits
a new crime; (2) absconds supervision; or (3) violates a specific
condition of probation after serving two brief periods of
“confinement in response to violation” for committing technical
violations.95 Both frameworks successfully maneuver around the
result in penal consequences.”).
91. Doherty, supra note 89, at 304–05. Several courts have found
similar conditions of probation to be unconstitutional. See, e.g., Dulin v.
State, 346 N.E.2d 746, 753 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that a condition
requiring probationer to be of good behavior was “so vague as to be
unreasonable”); Glenn v. State, 327 S.W. 2d 763, 764 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959)
(concluding that a condition requiring a probationer to “conduct himself as to
warrant the confidence and esteem of all law-abiding citizens of this state”
was “neither definite nor certain as to the conduct required”). Even narrower
conditions have been found to be unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., United
States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828, 848–49 (7th Cir. 2015) (condition forbidding
probationer from associating with any persons engaged in criminal activity or
convicted of a felony was unconstitutionally vague); In re Sheena K., 153 P.3d
282, 294 (Cal. 2007) (condition forbidding association with anyone
“disapproved of by probation” was vague and overbroad).
92. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text.
93. Authelet, 385 A.2d at 643–44.
94. Hoffa v. State, 368 N.E.2d 250, 252 (Ind. 1977) (emphasis added);
Gee v. State, 454 N.E.2d 1265, 1266 n.4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1344(a) (2011); State v. Nolen, 743 S.E.2d 729,
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constitutional minefields planted by a revocation system based on
non-criminal “bad” behavior.
Moreover, the requirement that a probationer must keep the
peace and be of good behavior may not be desirable as a matter of
public policy. Presumably, the primary goal of probation is to
promote public safety, not to create perfect citizens. Yet, some
justices appear to equate “good behavior” with “perfect
behavior”—an impossible burden for anyone to meet.
For
example, in one case, a Superior Court judge declared that the
probationer’s behavior “must be not only lawful, it must be
impeccable.”96 In another, a judge remarked that a probationer’s
behavior should be “above reproach.”97 Revoking probation for
imperfect behavior only increases corrections costs without an
appreciable improvement to public safety. The governing factual
standard in Rhode Island, in other words, is not tailored to the
overriding goal of probation.
Finally, requiring perfection sets the probationer up for
failure, for even the most careful and lawful individual is still only
human. As defense attorneys, we recognize this, and are often at
a loss when advising our clients, telling them to just do their best
to stay out of trouble, whatever that may be.
C. Pragmatic Solutions: Changing the Sentencing Paradigm
The Superior Court’s recommended amendment to its court
rules provides the justices with the ability to terminate a
probationary sentence once an individual has successfully
completed three years of probation and met certain other
conditions.98 The Superior Court also proposed a new benchmark
sentence––“Probation Benchmark 37”––that would limit
probationary terms to three years for non-violent crimes unless
“substantial and compelling circumstances exist.”99
These
recommendations target two intertwined problems that have
bedeviled Rhode Island’s probationary system in recent years: the
730 n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013).
96. State v. Wiggs, 635 A.2d 272, 274 (R.I. 1993).
97. Transcript of Bench Decision at 66, State v. Lamoureux, No. P1/932785A (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 2011), aff’d, 58 A.3d 189, 193–94 (R.I. 2013).
98. Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note
21, at 1–2.
99. Id. at 4.
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lack of uniformity in probationary sentencing, and probationary
periods that far exceed the national average in length.
Currently, it is customary for the prison sentence, usually
suspended in whole or in part, to equal the length of probation in
Rhode Island.100 Unlike most other states and the federal
system,101 Rhode Island does not cap its probationary terms;
rather, the length of a probationary sentence is only limited by the
maximum penalty for the crime charged.102 Most felonies in
Rhode Island are punishable by up to five years, ten years, twenty
years, or life in prison.103 For this reason, it is quite common to
see long probationary sentences tacked on to relatively short
prison sentences.
This practice, however, is misguided, for it fails to address the
separate and distinct purposes of a suspended sentence and
probation. The sentence that is handed down after a conviction––
whether suspended or imposed––should represent the appropriate
punishment for the relevant crime, taking into account the
severity of the crime, mitigating circumstances, and all other
factors contained within the sentencing benchmarks.104 When a
100. THIRD MEETING, supra note 28, at 49.
101. See ALISON LAWRENCE, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
MAKING SENSE OF SENTENCING: STATE SYSTEMS AND POLICIES 7 (2015), http://
www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/sentencing.pdf.
102. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-8(b) (2014).
103. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-5-8, -10, 11-42-4, 31-9-1 (2014) (assault
of a correctional officer, assault on a person over sixty years of age, threats to
public officials, driving a vehicle without the consent of the owner are all
punishable by five years in prison); §§ 11-8-2, 11-41-1, 11-41-2, 11-41-5, 1147-8 (breaking and entering into a dwelling house, larceny over $1500,
receiving stolen goods over $1500, obtaining money under false pretenses
over $1500, possession of a firearm without a license are all punishable by
ten years in prison); §§ 11-5-2, 11-4-3, 11-5-1 (felony assault, assault with a
dangerous weapon, second degree arson, assault with the intent to commit a
specified felony are all punishable by twenty years in prison); §§ 11-23-2, 1137-2, 11-37-8.2, 11-39-1, 11-4-2, 11-8-1 (first-degree murder, second-degree
murder, first-degree sexual assault, first-degree child molestation, firstdegree robbery, first-degree arson, and burglary are all punishable by life in
prison). Some felony sentences fall between these parameters. For instance,
a first conviction for drug possession of a drug other than marijuana carries a
three-year penalty, a second conviction for possession of drugs carries a sixyear penalty, and a third conviction for possession carries a nine-year penalty
and manslaughter carries a thirty-year sentence. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-23-3,
21-2-8-4.01.
104. Using The Benchmarks, in R.I. R. SUPER. CT. SENTENCING
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sentencing court, in an act of grace, suspends part, or all, of that
sentence, it allows the defendant the chance to demonstrate that
he or she can live safely in the community under prescribed
conditions. The amount of time that the probationer should live
under this supervision should be related to its efficacy. In other
words, probationers should be monitored only during the period of
time when they are likely to reoffend. In either of the two major
studies analyzing the data related to rates of recidivism in
America, a bell curve results: Within the first twelve months,
recidivism occurs at a high rate for prisoners following their
release from prison.105 The graph below illustrates that the rate
of arrests for new crimes or violations of probation decreases after
a prisoner has been out of prison for twelve months or more—the
curve of the bell flattens starkly between months twelve and
thirty-six:106

BENCHMARKS.
105. MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ALEXIA D. COOPER & HOWARD N. SNYDER,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 244205, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS
RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 to 2010, at 1 & fig.1
(2014) [hereinafter RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS], http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf.
106. Id.
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These statistics suggest that once a probationer has
completed three years of successful probation, it is very unlikely
that he or she will reoffend, rendering further monitoring
unnecessary. Many states recognize this, as twenty-seven other
states impose a maximum probationary cap of five years or fewer
in nearly every case107—a far cry from the five, ten, or even
twenty-year probationary sentences regularly imposed in this
state as a result of our instinctive bundling of the probationary
and suspended terms. However, if the Supreme Court approves
the rule changes recently recommended by the Superior Court, the
sentencing landscape in Rhode Island may soon be altered for the
better. In particular, by establishing a probation benchmark of
three years for most felonies108 and permitting the Court to
terminate probation when certain conditions are met,109 the
proposals seek to challenge Rhode Island’s reliance on
disproportionately long probation sentences and provide some
relief to qualifying individuals.
In addition to its lengthy probationary sentences, Rhode
Island also places people on probation at an alarmingly high
rate—the third-highest in the nation.110
As a result, the
pervasive problems with the probationary system likely affect over
twenty-three thousand individuals in this state—one in every
forty-four Rhode Islanders111—as well as their families. In the
capital city, the rate is doubled: One in twenty-one Providence
residents are currently under probation supervision.112
Even more troubling is the data showing that the
probationary system has a disproportionate effect on the minority
population. Currently, one in every six black adult males is under

107. LAWRENCE, supra note 101, at 7.
108. Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note
21, at 4.
109. Id. at 1–2.
110. ERINN J. HERBERMAN & THOMAS P. BONCZAR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, NCJ 248029, Probation and Parole in the United States, 2013, at
16 app. tbl.2 (rev. Jan. 21, 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
ppus13.pdf.
111. Id.; see also RI PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFENDERS LIVING IN RI
COMMUNITIES AS OF 12-31-14, supra note 16, at 1, 6.
112. RI PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFENDERS LIVING IN RI COMMUNITIES,
supra note 16, at 1, 6.
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community corrections supervision in Rhode Island.113 One in six.
The Hispanic community fares only slightly better, with one in
every fourteen adult males on probation.114
Although
comparatively lower, the percentage of adult, white males on
probation—one in every thirty-four —is still unacceptably high.115
1.

Earned Compliance Credit Legislation

As one of the central problems Rhode Island probationers face
is the sheer length in years of probation,116 other states and the
federal system may serve as models for a more restrained
probationary sentencing rubric, one that is better tailored to the
efficient and effective monitoring of probationers. Several states
have experimented with legislation designed to allow probationers
to earn a reduction in the term (or sometimes the type) of
community supervision attached to a sentence.117 The logic
behind such legislation is clear: It offers an incentive to
probationers to refrain from further criminal activity and comply
with the rules of community supervision.118 Earned good time
credit legislation has the added benefit of reducing the cost of
corrections and lowering the caseload of overburdened probation
officers.119 The exact calculation of earned compliance credit, or
earned good time credit, varies by state. Some states, like
Missouri, allow for probationers to be fully discharged from their
113. RIDOC HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 1, 29.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Comparing Bureau of Justice Statistics regarding probationary
sentences throughout the United States, with data from Rhode Island’s
Probation Department, the Council of State Governments found that Rhode
Island felony probation terms were 53% longer than in other states. COUNCIL
OF ST. GOV’TS: JUST. CTR., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT WORKING GROUP: FIRST
MEETING 1, 16 (July 7, 2015), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wpcontent/uploads/
2015/07/ RIWG1handout.pdf.
117. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CORR. SERVS. § 6-117 (West 2015) (reduces
or ends active supervision of an individual placed on probation, parole, or
mandatory release supervision; does not terminate, or end, the legal
expiration of probation); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.703 (2014) (“[R]educ[ing] the
term of probation, parole, or conditional release by thirty days for each full
calendar month of compliance with the terms of supervision.”).
118. See, e.g., Alison Lawrence, Justice Reinvestment in Missouri, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civiland-criminal-justice/justice-reinvestment-in-missouri.aspx.
119. Id.
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sentence due to earned compliance credit.120 Other states, like
Maryland, allow for reduced supervision rather than the full
termination of the probationary sentence.121
Missouri’s legislation, “reduce[s] the term of probation, parole,
or conditional release by thirty days for each full calendar month
of compliance with the terms of supervision.”122 Under the
Missouri law, probationers are informed biannually of the time
remaining on their probationary sentence after their earned
compliance credit is calculated.123 Probationers may be ordered
discharged from their sentences as long as they have completed at
least two years of supervision.124 Certain types of defendants—
those sentenced for violent crimes—are ineligible for earned
compliance credits.125
Other defendants—sentenced for
involuntary manslaughter, second degree assaults, and some
types of sex offenses—are eligible for good time credit but can be
found ineligible to earn compliance credits upon motion of the
sentencing court or prosecuting officer.126 There are, of course,
provisions for those who do not comply with probation rules, as
well as those who reoffend or violate probation.127
Rhode Island would benefit by either enacting an earned
120. MO. REV. STAT. § 217.703.
121. MD. CODE ANN. CORR. SERVS. § 6-117. It is worth noting that
legislative changes to the length of probationary sentences would likely need
to take into consideration a recent ruling by the Rhode Island Supreme Court
in Rose v. State, which determined that the original probationary sentence
handed down by the sentencing judge was inviolable even by Department of
Corrections good time sentencing regulations pertaining to good time credits
awarded for prison time. See 92 A.3d 903, 911–912 (R.I. 2014). Sentencing in
Rhode Island and elsewhere is a highly choreographed dance between
branches, with the General Assembly defining the permissible range of
sentences, the court proclaiming the sentence, and the executive
implementing the sentence. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
364 (1989) (noting that “[h]istorically, federal sentencing—the function of
determining the scope and extent of punishment—never has been thought to
be assigned by the Constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction of any one of
three branches of Government.”). It is no wonder, with those competing
interests, that disputes between the branches about the exact parameters of
sentencing power arise on occasion.
122. MO. REV. STAT. § 217.703.3.
123. Id. § 217.703.9.
124. Id. § 217.703.7.
125. Id. § 217.703.1(2).
126. Id. § 217.703.2.
127. See id. § 559.036(2)–(3) (Supp. 2014).
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compliance credit scheme similar to Missouri’s or adopting the
Superior Court’s proposed amendment to Rule 35 of its Rules of
Criminal Procedure. As discussed above, a person should only be
supervised on probation long enough to demonstrate that he or
she is able to remain in the community safely. States that
terminate probation early or impose a probationary cap—
discussed more fully in the pages that follow—recognize this
distinction, but Rhode Island courts continue to place men and
women on probationary periods for long periods of time. These
individuals are then subjected to the heightened behavior
requirements and exposed to the broken revocation process for
years longer than is necessary to protect public safety. The overprescription of probation comes with a real cost to the tens of
thousands of men and women who live within the system.
Probation is not only expensive—an actively monitored
probationer is subject to an “offender supervision” fee of twenty
dollars a month128—but it also can require regularly scheduled,
mandatory appointments with a probation officer.129 For a lowincome probationer with an inflexible employment schedule and/or
no vehicle, these conditions are particularly burdensome.130
128. R.I. DEP’T OF CORR., ADULT PROB. & PAROLE, NOTICE: PROBATION AND
PAROLE OFFENDER FEES (Mar. 17, 2008), http://sos.ri.gov/documents/archives/
regdocs/released/pdf/DOC/5452.pdf.
129. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 942 A.2d 982, 983 (R.I. 2008) (involving a
defendant faced with a violation hearing “for failure to report to probation
and to notify his probation officer of a change in address”).
130. While special conditions of probation—such as substance abuse
counseling, mental health treatment, domestic violence classes, and
restitution payments—are often well-intentioned, these liberally-prescribed
requirements often place an unrealistic strain on the budgets of low-income
probationers. Failure to comply with these conditions of probation can result
in serious consequences, evidenced by the fact that over one-third of all
incarcerated violators have been sentenced on a technical petition, meaning
that he or she has not complied with one of the general rules of probation,
such as failing to report to the probation officer, leaving the state without
permission, or failing to complete a special condition. See RIDOC HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW, supra note 6, at 19. As discussed in Part I, even a short sentence
on a technical violation can result in the loss of employment or housing,
which leaves the probationer in far worse financial straits once released from
prison, therefore making it increasingly difficult to comply with probation’s
requirements. Many probationers end up trapped in this vicious cycle as
short sentences accumulate into years of incarceration, all based on a
probationer’s inability—for reasons financial or otherwise—to comply with
the technical demands of probation.
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Placing Limits on Probationary Sentences

Unlike Rhode Island, most states have placed relatively short
statutory maximums on the length of probation periods, limiting
felony supervision (with the exception of sex crimes) to between
three and ten years.131 According to the National Council of State
Legislatures, at least eighteen states have limited probation to
five years in length, and nine states have limits that vary based
on the offense or the class of offense.132
Like the twenty-seven other states that cap probationary
terms, the federal system also employs a relatively restrained
community supervision sentencing regime where all supervision—
aside from certain sex, drug trafficking, and terrorism cases—is
capped at five years.133 The federal model offers one example of a
sentencing system that curtails the length of probationary
supervision while still respecting public safety concerns and data
about when probationers tend to reoffend. Rhode Island imposes
probationary terms in almost all sentences handed down by the
District and Superior Courts.134 Like Rhode Island, supervision is
also imposed in most federal cases but the federal system uses two
separate terms to describe the supervision: supervised release and
probation. Supervised release refers to supervision imposed upon
defendants after they serve a prison sentence.135 Probation, in
the federal scheme, constitutes supervision imposed when no
prison sentence is handed down.136 In both situations, the length
131. LAWRENCE, supra note 101, at 7.
Some states require that
probationary sentences be imposed rather than incarceration for certain
types of crimes. For instance, mandatory probationary sentences are
required in Kansas and Minnesota for some offenders. Id. In other states,
probation is mandated as a sentence for certain crimes, with a narrow
exception when the defendant is considered unsafe to supervise in the
community. Id.
132. Id.
133. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3561(c), 3583(b) (2012).
134. Probation is included in sentences of straight probation,
probationary sentences running with suspended prison time, and
probationary sentences running at the same time, and after, prison terms are
imposed. See, e.g., State v. Dantzler, 690 A.2d 338, 339 (R.I. 1997). As noted
above, Rhode Island has the third highest rate of people on probation, per
100,000 residents, in the United States. See HERBERMAN & BONCZAR, supra
note 110, at 16 app. tbl.2.
135. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a).
136. See id. § 3561.
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of supervision a sentencing judge may impose is governed by
sentencing guidelines and federal law.137 No supervised release
sentence or sentence of probation exceeds five years, except for
certain sex offenses, drug trafficking, and terrorism offenses.138
For instance, for class C and class D felonies—which carry
statutory maximum penalties up to twelve years and up to six
years, respectively—the term of supervised release imposed must
be three years or less.139 For class A and B felonies—those which
carry statutory maximum penalties of life in prison and twentyfive years, respectively—the supervised release term must be five
years or less (except for certain types of sex offenses, drug
trafficking, and terrorism offenses).140
These limited probationary regimes throughout the fifty
states and the federal government stand in stark contrast to
Rhode Island’s lengthy terms of probation. Practitioners from
different parts of the state’s criminal justice system have pointed
out that criminal defendants in Rhode Island often trade shorter
prison sentences for longer probationary terms, leading to a
cultural acceptance of long probationary sentences.141 However,
making changes to the probationary scheme in Rhode Island (such
as capping the length of probation for certain categories of crimes,
as recently proposed by the Superior Court) could refocus the
entire criminal justice community on the true purposes of
probation. Judges and attorneys—both prosecution and defense—
might no longer view the imposition of lengthy probationary
sentences as part of the status quo of the Rhode Island sentence

137. See, e.g., id. §§ 3561, 3583.
138. See, e.g., id. § 3583(k) (certain offenses involving minors); 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)–(C) (describing mandatory minimum supervised release
sentences for drug trafficking offenses); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5D1.2(b) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2014) (allowing up to lifetime
supervised release for certain terrorism crimes or any sex offense).
139. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2).
140. Id. § 3583(b)(1).
141. Rhode Island has a relatively low incarceration rate compared to
other states.
The Bureau of Justice Statistics ranks Rhode Island’s
incarceration rate in the middle thirty-nine of states in terms of sentenced
prisoners per 100,000 of population. See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2013, NCJ 247282, 7 tbl.6 (rev. Sept. 30, 2014),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf. This means Rhode Island is
neither among the five lowest states in incarceration rate, nor among the five
highest states in incarceration rate. See id.
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bargaining system; instead, we all might see that our
unnecessarily long probationary terms are an anomaly in the
American criminal justice system signifying a deviation from fair
and efficient sentencing practices.
In the same vein, the Superior Court’s recent recommendation
to set a probation benchmark sentence of three years for nonviolent felony offenses142 is a major step forward. Adopting this
proposal would lead to increased consistency in probationary
sentencing, while taking into account public safety and law
enforcement concerns. As nearly all re-offenses occur within the
first three years of a probationary period,143 a probationary
sentence of ten, fifteen, or even twenty-five years is needlessly
excessive, punitive, and inefficient. A three-year cap, on the other
hand, would conserve resources and allow probation officers more
time to focus on their higher-risk clients.144 Indeed, imposing
probationary term limits could be a practical fix to the problem of
ineffectively long probationary sentences—and one that may be
fairly simple to accomplish in Rhode Island.145
142. Order Soliciting Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note
21, at 4.
143. See RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS, supra note 105, at 1 & fig.1.
144. The effect of the Superior Court’s Benchmark 37 will be directly
proportional to how many people fall within its ambit. One potential
weakness of the proposed benchmark is that many felony offenses are
disqualified from consideration. For example, the Benchmark 37 does not
apply to cases where no-contact orders or restitution are imposed, thereby
excluding most domestic-related offenses, most financial crimes, and many
theft offenses from the three-year probation cap. See Order Soliciting
Comments on Proposed Amendments, supra note 21, at 4. Rather than
excluding these types of cases entirely, it might be more efficacious to allow
the imposition of a no-contact order or a restitution order to be a factor to
consider when making a departure from the three-year benchmark.
Similarly, more narrowly defining those offenses excluded from the
benchmark because they meet the definition of a “crime of violence” would
broaden the reach of the benchmark and extend its applicability to, for
instance, some types of felony assaults and breaking and entering offenses
which are barred in the current proposal.
145.
Separation of powers arguments have been implicated in recent
legislation regarding sentencing. If the probationary benchmark sentences
were created by court committee, the benchmarks would necessarily be
discretionary guidelines rather than mandatory sentencing rules and, as
such, would not interfere with the General Assembly’s constitutional
prerogative to define criminal offenses and their punishments and to regulate
the imposition and execution of sentences, including the parameters for the
suspension and execution of sentences of imprisonment. State v. Monteiro,
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CONCLUSION

At its best, probation provides certain offenders the
opportunity to accept responsibility for past wrongdoings in a
rehabilitative environment, where they can be monitored and
counseled as they seek employment, support their families, and
attempt to distance themselves from their criminal
past. However, as discussed in this Article, Rhode Island’s
probationary system has failed to function as intended, resulting
in the costly incarceration of too many of its residents. Too often,
otherwise productive citizens collapse under inordinately long
sentences that are imposed in a one-sided violation scheme, while
others, like Dennis, end up with life-long criminal records due to
minor mistakes. Like the eponymous sailor in Samuel Taylor
Coleridge’s The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, these probationers
are unable to free themselves from the weight of their past
transgressions until long after they have suffered unnecessarily.
Unlike the doomed mariner, however, there is hope for the
probationers of Rhode Island. We are encouraged by the interest
in reform that has been expressed in the wake of the Mass
Incarceration Symposium, and as public defenders, we look
forward to collaborating with the various stakeholders working to
create a fair and efficient offender rehabilitation system, which
would benefit all Rhode Islanders.

924 A.2d 784, 793 (R.I. 2007); State v. Tucker, 747 A.2d 451, 454–55 (R.I.
2000).

